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Abstract
We consider a model with two backbones and a ﬁnite number of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) connected to the backbones. ISPs decide on private
peering agreements, comparing the beneﬁts of private peering to costs. Intra-
backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same back-
bone, whereas inter-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected
to diﬀerent backbones. We formulate the model as a two-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, ISPs decide on peering agreements. In the second stage they com-
pete in prices a la Bertrand. We examine the eﬀects of peering on proﬁts of
ISPs. Peering aﬀects proﬁts through two channels - reduction of backbone con-
gestion which we call the symmetric eﬀect and ability to send traﬃcb y p a s s i n g
or circumventing congested backbones which we call the asymmetric eﬀect.
The ﬁrst has a negative or ambiguous eﬀect while the second has a generally
positive eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts. The two often act against each other making
the net eﬀect ambiguous. We also conduct simulations to determine pairwise
stable peering conﬁgurations in a six-provider model and ﬁnd that there is a
paucity of inter-backbone peering in asymmetric settings.
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11 Introduction
The Internet is comprised of many distinct networks, which are operated by diﬀerent
ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has its own network, where the connected users can communicate
with each other. The end-users of the Internet are consumers and websites. End-
users generally want to have access to all other possible end-users, regardless of the
network they are attached to. To provide such universal connectivity to their users,
the ﬁrms must interconnect with each other and share their network infrastructure.
Two main forms of interconnection emerged following privatization of the National
Access Points - peering under which ﬁrms carry each other’s traﬃc without any
payments and transit under which the downstream ﬁrm pays the upstream ﬁrm a
certain settlement payment for carrying its traﬃc.
Universal connectivity requires some structure on the connectivity agreements.
The Internet has a loosely hierarchical structure (Ross and Kurose, 2000). At the
top of the hierarchy are the backbones, also called Internet Access Providers (here-
after IAPs), that own national and/or international high speed networks. The four
largest IAPs in the U.S. are UUNET/MCI (27.9%), AT&T (10%), SPRINT (6.5%)
and GENUITY/LEVEL3 (6.3%) (Haynal, 2003). The second layer of the hierarchy
includes so called retail Internet Service Providers (hereafter ISPs). At the bottom
of the hierarchy are the end users, i.e. namely consumers who browse the web and
websites.
In general,end-users connect to ISPs. ISPs connect to backbones. Backbones con-
nect to each other at the National Access Points (hereafter NAPs) as illustrated in
Figure 1. With regard to connectivity agreements, large IAPs mostly peer with each
other at the NAPs and these are called public peerings. The growing congestion at
the NAPs have increasingly necessitated private peering between the IAPs which refer
direct connections between providers bypassing NAPs. ISPs generally have transit
agreements with backbones but they also privately peer with other ISPs which are
called retail peerings. We refer peering between two ISPs connected to the same
backbone as intra-backbone peering and that between two ISPs connected to diﬀer-
ent backbones as inter-backbone peering. Inter and intra-backbone peerings among
Internet service providers have two distinct (though not completely unrelated eﬀects)
on quality of service and ultimately proﬁts of the ﬁrms. First, intra-backbone peering
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reduces the traﬃc within the backbone and raises the quality of all ISPs connected
to that backbone. Inter-backbone peering reduces the traﬃc between backbones and
raises the quality of all ISPs connected to both backbones. We call this the symmetric
eﬀect or traﬃcd i v e r t i n ge ﬀect. Due to the symmetric eﬀect, peering in general has
strong positive externalities. The chief reason why ISPs may be interested in peering
is not the symmetric eﬀect but the asymmetric eﬀect or the circumventing eﬀect.
Users (both web sites and consumers) who connect through privately peered lines
avoid the congestion/delays associated with going through backbones and National
Access Points. This raises the quality of the ISPs who peer and increases the demand
of those ISPs. We call this the asymmetric or circumventing eﬀect.
The ﬁrst eﬀect has been captured by DangNyugen and Penard (1999) using a
model of club behavior and vertical diﬀerentiation. They consider a model with two
asymmetric backbones and identical retail ISPs connected to those backbones. The
retail ISPs engage in both intra-backbone peering and inter-backbone peering. They
make the assumption that ISPs connected to the same backbone behave like a club
3and collude with regard to pricing and connectivity behavior. The authors extend
the standard model of vertical product diﬀerentiation to show that ISPs connected
to the high quality backbone will always peer with each other. But they may or may
not peer with the ISPs connected to the low quality backbone. Also, in the latter
case, the ISPs of the low quality backbone will peer with each other. The results are
illustrated with some evidence from the French Internet market. The second eﬀect
has been captured among others, by Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003) who show
that threat of traﬃc diversion creates strong incentives for peering among backbones
or IAPs.
Before starting the model, we brieﬂy discuss the literature. Generally, one would
expect investment in the Internet infrastructure to be sub-optimal under peering us-
ing the standard argument of the “tragedy of the commons”, given that providers
share a common backbone, especially in presence of large asymmetries. A number of
authors have made this point in a variety of contexts (see Little and Wright (1999),
Cremer et al. (2000)). Such problems can be avoided under transit or settlement
payments. However, transit between large backbones may be impractical given pro-
hibitive costs of monitoring the Internet traﬃc and may account for the paucity of
transit agreements among large backbones. In the future, when monitoring technol-
ogy improves bringing down monitoring costs, we expect to see peering agreements
being replaced by transit agreements.
There is a related body of literature in Internet economics that deal with pricing
that we mention in passing. Mackie-Mason and Varian (1995) have pointed out that
the current practice of ﬂat-rate pricing (charging a ﬁxed fee to consumers unrelated
to usage) encourages overusage and hence congestion. Their solution to the problem
is setting up a smart market to price consumers according to usage. Of course, this
involves a technological leap but may become feasible in near future.
Currently, Internet services oﬀered by an ISP have little horizontal diﬀerentiation
oﬀering the same basic services of web-browsing, emails, real time conversation and
some Internet telephony but there is some vertical diﬀerentiation. Some authors
have examined price and product diﬀerentiation in services. Odlyzko (1997) suggests
multiservice mechanism, where users can choose between ﬁrst and second class service
and pay accordingly, even though the quality is not necessarily diﬀerent. Gibbens
4et al (2000) discusses the competition between two Internet service providers, when
either or both of them choose to oﬀer multiple service classes. Assuming a uniform
distribution of user preferences towards congestion and a ﬁnite number of networks,
they prove that, even when Internet service providers are free to set capacities as
well as prices, multiproduct competition is not sustainable in a proﬁt maximizing
equilibrium.
In this paper, we examine incentives for peering among the retail Internet service
providers taking into account both the symmetric and asymmetric eﬀects, where
ISPs can choose to peer both within and across backbones. A two stage game is
considered. In the ﬁrst stage, ISPs decide on peering and in the second stage, given the
contractual conﬁguration, they compete a la Bertrand. We ﬁnd that symmetric and
asymmetric eﬀects of peering often have opposite eﬀects on ﬁrms’ proﬁts making the
net eﬀect ambiguous. Hence, the decision to peer or not largely depends on underlying
parameters such as network capacity, number of ISPs connected to each backbone
and number of consumers and websites connected to each ISP. Under simulations
with six ISPs and two backbones, we ﬁnd that a variety of conﬁgurations emerge in
equilibrium depending on the values of the aforesaid parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the as-
sumptions underlying the model. In section 3, we analyze the second stage and we
determine equilibrium prices. In section 4, we analyze the ﬁrst stage and determine
the equilibrium network. Finally, we conclude.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin with the assumptions underlying the model. We consider two backbones
A and B and a ﬁnite set of N ISPs denoted by η = {1,2,3,...,N} where N ∈ N.
We assume that each ISP is connected to one of the backbones, but not both. Every
ISP has a transit agreement with the backbone it is connected to. According to that
agreement the ISP pays the backbone a certain settlement for interconnection which
is given exogenously. Without loss of generality, we assume that ISPs 1,...,m are
connected to backbone A and ISPs m +1 ,...,N are connected to backbone B.L e t
ηA = {1,...,m} and ηB = {m +1 ,...,N}. Generally we will index backbones by l,










Backbone A Backbone A Backbone B Backbone B
NAP  NAP 
ISP1 ISP1








l ∈ {A,B} and ISPs by i,j, i,j ∈ η. We illustrate this in Figure 2. We assume that
each ISP pays an access fee (transit) Fl if it is connected to backbone l.We distinguish
between two types of end-users - consumers and websites. There is a continuum of
consumers of mass 1 and a continuum of websites of mass 1 as well. We assume
away any micro-payments from websites to consumers and vice versa. Let αi denote
the proportion of consumers connected to ISP i and di be the proportion of websites











αi’s are given exogenously. di’s will be determined endogenously by explicit modelling
of website preferences. Thus, α is the proportion of consumers who have chosen the
ISPs connected to backbone A. Similarly, 1 − α is the proportion of consumers who
have chosen the ISPs connected to backbone B.
In general it can be asserted that there is little traﬃc between websites. Traﬃc
6between consumers while not negligible are miniscule compared to traﬃcf r o mw e b -
sites to consumers. Thus, most of the traﬃc between the websites and the consumers
is unidirectional, i.e., from websites to consumers. To capture this traﬃc pattern in
its simplest form, we ignore all traﬃc between consumers, and from consumers to
websites and focus exclusively on the traﬃc from websites to consumers. We assume
following Laﬀont et. al (2001) that consumers are interested in all websites inde-
pendently of their network choices. A consumer is as likely to request a page from
a given website belonging to her network and another website belonging to a rival
network. This is referred in the aforesaid paper as "balanced calling pattern". Hence,
we assume each consumer requests one unit of traﬃc from each website. This gives
precise measure to the proportion of traﬃc originating in ISP i and terminating in
ISP j,n a m e l y ,
tij = di · αj
To be consistent with the standard terminology, we refer to traﬃc between ISPs
belonging to the same backbone as on-net traﬃca n dt r a ﬃc going from one backbone
to another as oﬀ-net traﬃc. With regard to traﬃc movement between backbones,
backbone providers follow what is called “hot potato routing” - pass oﬀ net traﬃc
as soon as possible. Given this pattern of traﬃc, it is not unrealistic to assume
that all oﬀ-net traﬃc is borne by the receiver backbone. Hence, traﬃc requested by
consumers in A from websites in B will be borne by backbone A. Similarly, traﬃc
requested by consumers in B from websites in A will be borne by B.
Let Ui be the utility derived by a website connected to ISP i:
Ui = V − δi − pi
where pi is the price charged by ISP i and δi is the delay associated with ISP i,a n d
V is the value from the connectivity to the Internet. We assume V to be suﬃciently
l a r g es ot h a tn oc o n s u m e rd r o p so u to ft h em a r k e t .
Delays occur due to excessive traﬃc in the backbone. Deﬁne sl to be the network
capacity of backbone l (l ∈ {A,B}). The network capacity is the maximum amount
of traﬃc that the backbone can handle without experiencing delay. We assume that
the network capacities are exogenously given. Thus, if tl is the amount of traﬃc
coming into backbone l, the delay in backbone l is tl − sl.
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αi · dj =1− α
ISPs can enter into private peering agreements with each other. If two ISPs build a
private peering link, then that peering is referred to as intra-backbone peering, if the
ISPs are connected to the same backbone, and inter-backbone peering, if the ISPs
are connected to diﬀerent backbones. For example, in Figure 3, ISP 2 has an intra-
backbone peering agreement with ISP 1 and an inter-backbone peering agreement
with ISP m+2. In order to model private peering, we introduce a standard network
notation borrowed from Goyal and Joshi (2000). For any two distinct ISPs i and j,
deﬁne a binary variable gij ∈ {0,1} where
gij =
(
1 if a private peering arrangement exists between i and j
0 if no such arrangement exists
8Obviously, gij = gji. If gij =1 , we say a link exists or a link is formed between i and
j.T h en e t w o r kg = {gij}i,j∈η,i6=j is then a collection of links. Let g − gij denote the
network obtained by severing an existing link between i and j from the network g
while g + gij is the network obtained by adding a new link between i and j in the
network g. The network g for which gij =1for all i,j ∈ η,i 6= j is called the complete
network. The network g for which gij =0for all i,j ∈ η,i 6= j is called the empty
network.
We assume each private peering link entails a transfer of traﬃc amounting to σ
between i and j, that is capacity of each private peering link is equal to σ.U s a g ei s
shared equally and costs are borne equally. Assuming quadratic costs, each such link
costs σ2 and the cost borne by each of the two ISPs forming a link is σ2/2. We assume
that the private lines are completely uncongested and hence traﬃc traversing such
links experience zero delays. Given that private links carry traﬃc that otherwise
would have been carried by backbones, private peering links also reduce backbone
congestion by reducing backbone traﬃc.
Now we can compute the average delay experienced by ISP i,n a m e l y ,δi.L e t
nAA denote the number of intra-backbone links for backbone A, nBB be the number














Further, let niA be the number of links ISP i has with members of ηA and niB be the
number of links ISP i has with members of ηB. Let ni be the total number of private





ni = niA + niB
Let ωl be the reduction or leakage in the traﬃco fb a c k b o n el as a result of private
9peerings. Then,
ωA =( nAA) · σ +( nAB) · (σ/2)
ωB =( nBB) · σ +( nAB) · (σ/2)
The traﬃco fb a c k b o n el is reduced by the amount of on-net traﬃc diverted through
intra-backbone private peering links and by the amount of the outgoing oﬀ-net traﬃc
diverted through inter-backbone peering links. Each intra-backbone link reduces on-
net traﬃcb yσ and each inter-backbone link reduces oﬀ-net outgoing traﬃcb yσ/2
given that usage of peered links is shared equally.
Hence, if θl is the amount of congestion in backbone l,t h e n
θl = tl − sl − ωl
Traﬃc going through private peering links experience zero delays because we explicitly
assume that ISPs keep their private links uncongested. All extra traﬃci sr o u t e d
through the backbones. The traﬃc going through backbone A experience congestion
of θA and the traﬃc going through backbone B experience a congestion of θB. If
θA >θ B, we refer to A as the low quality backbone and B as the high quality
backbone and vice versa.
Consider an ISP connected to backbone A. Given that this ISP has niA intra-
b a c k b o n el i n k sa n de a c hs u c hl i n kc a nc a r r yσ/2 of traﬃc, on-net traﬃc circulating
through privately peered lines is equal to niA ·(σ/2) and this traﬃc experiences zero
delay. Given that total volume of on-net traﬃc going out from this ISP is α · di,t h e
traﬃc that traverses backbone A and experiences a delay of θA is α·di −niA ·(σ/2).
Next, the oﬀ-net traﬃc going out from this ISP is (1−α)·di of which again niB·(σ/2)
amount of traﬃc travels through privately peered lines and experiences zero delay.
Hence, (1 − α) · di − niB · (σ/2) amount of traﬃc traverses both backbones and is
largely borne by the receiver backbone B and hence experiences delay θB. Therefore,
if i ∈ ηA
1,
δi = θA · (α · di − niA · (σ/2)) + θB · ((1 − α) · di − niB · (σ/2))
1Traﬃc going from websites to consumers connected to the same ISP do not have to traverse any
backbone or private peering link. So strictly speaking, we have to deduct this leakage from traﬃc
ﬂows through backbones. We assume that this leakage is relatively small and can be ignored.
10Similarly, if j ∈ ηB,
δj = θB · ((1 − α) · dj − njB · (σ/2)) + θA · (α · dj − njA · (σ/2))
Equilibrium demands are determined by equating utilities of all websites given that
in equilibrium all websites must derive an identical utility from each ISP. As far as
the ISPs are concerned, we will analyze a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ISPs
form links that determines the network structure g. In the second stage they compete
in prices a la Bertrand. Consistent with the logic of backward induction, we start
with the second stage.
3 Analysis of the Second Stage
Given a certain network g and the fact that ﬁrms compete as Bertrand oligopolists, we
can solve for equilibrium prices in the second stage. We show the details in Appendix
1. Here we just present the results in the form of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let ,
γi =
σ(niA · θA + niB · θB)
2
for all i ∈ η
e θ = α · θA +( 1− α) · θB










































































ni − Fl (3)
11Of course, the above proposition represents the unique interior solution. For the
interior solution to exist and be applicable, we need certain parameter constraints.
Speciﬁcally, θA > 0 and θB > 0 requires
σ<
2(α − sA)
(2 · nAA + nAB)
σ<
2(1 − α − sB)
(2 · nBB + nAB)
sA <α






(N − m)(N − m − 1)
2
nAB 6 m(N − m)
we have





2 · nBB + nAB
2
6
(N − m)(2 · N − 2 · m − 1)
2
In order to ensure that the above constraints are satisﬁed for all possible networks,
we assume the following parameter constraints:
0 <s A <α<1 (4)
0 <s B < 1 − α (5)





2(1 − α − sB)
(N − m)(2 · N − 2 · m − 1)
¾
(6)
To allow the possibility of link formation within each backbone, we also assume that
m>1,N >3.
We have stated before that θA is the measure of congestion in backbone A and
θB is the measure of congestion in backbone B. T h eb a c k b o n ew i t ht h el o w e rl e v e lo f
congestion will be referred to as the high quality backbone and that with the higher
level of congestion will be referred to as the low quality backbone.
12Hence, e θ = α·θA+(1−α)·θB is the level of congestion in each backbone weighted
by the traﬃc ﬂowing through each backbone is an average measure of congestion in
the whole network. e θ captures the symmetric eﬀect of peering because changes in
backbone congestion primarily aﬀect this parameter.
As far as the asymmetric eﬀect is concerned, γi will be referred to as the “link
density factor” of ISP i. It is proportional to the number of links ISP i has in
each backbone weighted by the level of congestion. The weights reﬂect the fact that
forming links in congested backbones to divert traﬃc is more valuable than forming










κi which is proportional to the diﬀerence between the link density factor of ISP i and
the average link density factor captures the asymmetric eﬀect of peering because it
is proportional to γi which reﬂects the impact of circumventing congested backbones
on delay.
To see this clearly, we can express the delay or congestion of ISP i,n a m e l yδi in
terms of e θ and γi.
δi = di ·e θ − γi
Higher the overall backbone congestion, greater is the delay, but delay can be
reduced by increasing the link density factor because traﬃc can now circulate through
uncongested lines. Increasing demand also increases delay because larger amount of
the traﬃc passes through congested backbones.

















































13By gross proﬁts we mean proﬁts gross of link formation costs or proﬁts not taking
into account link formation costs. Hence, gross proﬁt is simply the product of price
and demand minus the transit fee paid to the backbones. We can examine the impact
that symmetric and asymmetric eﬀects of peering have on gross proﬁts.










−(N − 1) · κi
(2 · N − 1) · N ·
³
e θ
´2 < 0 if κi > 0 and > 0 if κi < 0.
Hence, increasing the level of overall congestion increases prices.2 For ISPs with
above average link density, increasing the level of congestion reduces demand while
reducing the link density increases demand. For ISPs with below average link density,
the opposite is the case. Increasing the level of overall congestion increases demand
and vice versa.
Now an intra-backbone link reduces e θ by ασ through its eﬀect on the backbone
the ISPs belong to. An inter-backbone link reduces e θ by σ/2 through its impact on
both backbones. While those boost consumer utilities, they have either a negative
or an ambiguous eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts. For ISPs with below average link density
(κi < 0) the impact is deﬁnitely negative because given the signs of the derivatives
above, both prices and demands fall and hence gross proﬁts fall. For ISPs with above
average link density (κi < 0), the impact is ambiguous. While prices fall, demands
rise and hence the net eﬀect depends on the relative magnitudes of the two eﬀects.
It is somewhat counter-intuitive that peering should have a negative or ambiguous
eﬀect on gross proﬁt. This is because the eﬀect of reducing overall congestion on price
is always negative. This is because,
δi − δj =( di − dj) ·e θ − (γi − γj)
Hence, any increase in e θ accentuates the diﬀerence in quality or congestion or the
level of vertical diﬀerentiation between ﬁrms i and j. The increase in vertical diﬀer-
entiation softens price competition and enables both ﬁrms to charge higher prices.
In fact, both prices rise by an exactly equal amount in equilibrium and hence ﬁnal
2This is a standard result for congested goods (see De Palma and Leruth (1989)).
14diﬀe r e n c e si np r i c e sa sw e l la sd i ﬀerences in congestion remain unchanged. Hence the
initial increase in the diﬀerence in congestion is compensated by appropriate changes
in demands.











(2 · N − 1) · N ·e θ
> 0
Consider the impact of intra and inter-backbone links on κi. There is a direct
eﬀect owing to the fact the traﬃc can now travel through uncongested lines and
there is an indirect eﬀect owing to the impact of link formation on congestion in
the backbones θA and θB. We ignore the indirect eﬀect because it involves terms σ2
which is negligible if σ is small. Thus an intra-backbone link for i ∈ ηl boosts κi by
N · σ · θl
2
and hence has a positive impact on gross proﬁts. An inter-backbone link
increases κi by
σ[(N − 1)θ−l − θl]
2
where −l refers to the backbone other than l.I fi
belongs to the high quality backbone, namely, θ−l >θ l, inter-backbone links increase
gross proﬁts. If i belongs to the low quality backbone, θ−l <θ l, inter-backbone links
increase gross proﬁts provided the quality diﬀerence between the two backbones is
not very high, i.e. (N − 1)θ−l >θ l. However, if the quality diﬀerence between the
two backbones is very high, (N −1)θ−l <θ l, then inter-backbone peering has indeed
a negative eﬀect on gross proﬁts.
Hence we get Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (a) For ISPs with link density that is below the average link density,
the symmetric eﬀects of intra-backbone or inter-backbone peering on gross proﬁts are
always negative. For those with link density above the average, the eﬀect is ambigu-
ous.
(b) For all ISPs, the asymmetric eﬀect of intra-backbone peering on gross proﬁts is
always positive. For ISPs connected to high quality backbones, the eﬀe c to fi n t e r -
backbone peering is also positive. However, for ISPs connected to low quality back-
bones, the eﬀect is positive if the diﬀerence in quality between the two backbones is
suﬃciently small and negative otherwise.
15We can summarize these facts in form of the following tables. Let HH denote the
fact that the ISP in question belongs to the high quality backbone and has higher
than average link density. Let HL denote the fact that the ISP in question belongs
to the high quality backbone and has lower than average link density. Let LH denote
t h ef a c tt h a tt h eI S Pi nq u e s t i o nb e l o n g st ot h el o wq u a l i t yb a c k b o n ea n dh a sh i g h e r
than average link density. Let LL denote the fact that the ISP in question belongs
to the low quality backbone and has lower than average link density.
_____________________________________________











HH Ambiguous Positive Ambiguous Positive
HL Negative Positive Negative Positive
LH Ambiguous Positive Ambiguous Positive
LL Negative Positive Negative Positive _____________________________________________











HH Ambiguous Positive Ambiguous Positive
HL Negative Positive Negative Positive
LH Ambiguous Positive Ambiguous Negative
LL Negative Positive Negative Negative _____________________________________________
Hence, one ﬁnds that quite often the symmetric eﬀect and asymmetric eﬀects
actually work against each other. This is because while peering improves quality
and hence prices, demands and proﬁts, its eﬀect on backbone congestion has the
unintended eﬀect of reducing vertical diﬀerentiation, stiﬀening price competition and
reducing prices and proﬁts. The net eﬀect us almost always ambiguous and stating
anything further would require comparison of relative magnitudes which in turn would
depend on relative values of parameters α,sl and m. Hence one would expect to ﬁnd
16a multitude of equilibrium networks depending on the values of these parameters, a
fact that we illustrate in the next section with simulations.
However, we can state one thing with certainty. If the quality diﬀerence between
the two backbones is substantial, namely (N − 1)θA <θ B or vice versa, then ISPs
connected to the quality backbone have no interest in interpeering if it also has lower
than average link density. This is because gross proﬁts reduce with inter-backbone
peering given that both the symmetric and asymmetric eﬀects are negative, and the
added cost of link formation further reduces net proﬁts. This actually forms the basis
of Proposition 3.
4 Analysis of the First Stage
We will analyze the ﬁrst stage using the notion of pairwise stability which was in-
troduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if given the
network, there is no incentive to either form links or destroy links. Since links are
formed unilaterally but can be broken bilaterally, we can formally deﬁne it as follows:
Deﬁnition: Let πi(g) denoted the reduced proﬁts of stage 1 for a network g. The
network g is pairwise stable if for all i,j ∈ η :
(a) If gij =1 ,then πi(g) > πi(g − gij) and πj(g) > πj(g − gij)
(b) If gij =0 and πi(g + gij) >π i(g),t h e nπj(g + gij) <π j(g)
The intuition here is quite simple. Links are formed bilaterally but can be broken
unilaterally. Hence, in a pairwise stable network, neither player should gain by break-
ing a link while at least one player must lose or remain indiﬀerent through forming a
new link.
Before we embark on simulations, let us formalize our analysis in the previous
section in the form of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Let (N − 1)θ−l <θ l where l represents the low quality backbone,
namely the quality diﬀerential between the two backbones is suﬃciently large. Then,
in any pairwise stable network, there will be no inter-backbone peering between two
ISPs with diﬀerent link densities if the ISP belonging to the low quality backbone has
lower than average link density.
17In all other cases, given that net eﬀects of peering are ambiguous, we cannot
state anything for certain. However, we can do some simulations. We will only
study six-provider networks. The choice of six is not entirely arbitrary. Since the
number of ISPs attached to each backbone has to be greater than or equal to two
for any meaningful analysis, six is the smallest number that allows us to consider
both symmetry as well asymmetry in the number of ﬁrms attached to individual
backbones. We will consider only the following eight possible cases or eight possible
networks.3
1. All ISPs peer with each other. The resulting network called a complete network
is denoted by gAB1.
2. There is no peering whatsoever. The resulting network called an empty network
is denoted by g000.
3. All ISPs belonging to both backbones engage in intra-backbone peering but
there is no inter-backbone peering. We refer to the resulting network by gAB0.
4. All ISPs belonging to backbone A engage in intra-backbone peering. How-
ever there is neither any inter-backbone peering nor any intra-backbone peering in
backbone B. We refer to this network as gA00.
5. All ISPs belonging to backbone B engage in intra-backbone peering. How-
ever there is neither any inter-backbone peering nor any intra-backbone peering in
backbone A. We refer to this network as g0B0.
6. All ISPs belonging to backbone A engage in intra-backbone peering. There
is no intra-backbone peering in backbone B but there is inter-backbone peering. We
refer to this network as gA01.
7. All ISPs belonging to backbone B engage in intra-backbone peering. There
is no intra-backbone peering in backbone A but there is inter-backbone peering. We
refer to this network as g0B1.
8. No intra-backbone peering whatsoever but there is inter-backbone peering.
We refer to this network as g001.
Case 1: We start with perfect symmetry, namely, α =0 .5,m=3 ,s A = sB = s
(say). Then the area where all parameter constraints (4)-(6) are satisﬁed is repre-
3Checking more complicated networks for pairwise stability requires some programming which is
reserved as a future endeavour.
18sented by ﬁgure 4 where we plot σ and s a l o n gt h et w oa x e s . T h i sﬁgure and all
subsequent ﬁgures are in Appendix 2. We will refer to the parameter range for which
constraints (4)-(6) are satisﬁed as the feasible parameter range or the feasible range.4
We ﬁnd that with complete symmetry, two networks are pairwise stable in the
feasible parameter range, namely, the complete network and the empty network.
Figure 5 represents the area where the complete network is pairwise stable. Figure
6 represents the area where the empty network is pairwise stable. The two areas
represent mutually exclusive parameter ranges, hence, for a given set of parameter
values, there is an unique pairwise stable network which is either the complete or
the empty network. This is clear from Figure 7 where we represent the two areas in
the same ﬁgure. Under complete symmetry, all ﬁr m sf a c ee x a c t l yt h es a m eb e n e ﬁts
and costs. Hence, it is expected that we get symmetric outcomes, namely either all
ﬁrms will peer or nobody will peer. Depending on the magnitudes of σ and s either
o u t c o m ei sf e a s i b l e .
Case 2: Next we will introduce asymmetries. We ﬁnd that introduction of
asymmetries result in other pairwise stable networks. We begin with an asymmetry
in the network capacity. Speciﬁcally, assume that sA >s B = s.W ep l o tσ,sA and
sB = s along the three axes. We ﬁnd that there are two additional pairwise stable
network conﬁgurations within the feasible parameter range besides the complete and
the empty network, namely, the network gAB0 and the network g0B0. We summarize
this in ﬁgures 8 to 12. The ﬁgures are three dimensional to account for the fact
that sA and sB are represented in two diﬀerent axes. Figure 8 represents the feasible
parameter range. Figure 9 represents the area where the complete network is pairwise
stable. Figure 10 represents the area where the empty network is pairwise stable.
Figure 11 represents the area where the network gAB0 is pairwise stable. Figure 12
represents the area where the network g0B0 is pairwise stable.
Case 3: Next, starting from perfect symmetry, let us introduce an asymmetry in
the number of ﬁrms connected to each backbone. Here our options are quite limited.
We can consider only the case where m =4and n =6 .W ep l o tσ and s(= sA = sB)
on the two axes. We ﬁn dt h a ta g a i nt h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ep a i r w i s es t a b l en e t w o r k s
4The ﬁgures have by developed using Mathematica. Computations are available at
www.ﬁlebox.vt.edu/users/schakrab/computations.htm.
19besides the complete and the empty network in the feasible parameter range, namely,
the network gAB0 and the network g0B0. We represent this situation in ﬁgure 13 to
18. Figure 13 represents the feasible parameter range. Figure 14 represents the
area where the complete network is pairwise stable. Figure 15 represents the area
where the empty network is pairwise stable. Figure 16 represents the area where the
network gAB0 is pairwise stable. Figure 17 represents the area where the network g0B0
is pairwise stable. The areas are mutually exclusive hence for a certain parameter
value we get an unique stable network. This can be seen from ﬁgure 18 where we
bring all the diﬀerent areas in one ﬁgure.
Case 4: Finally, let us explore asymmetries in the consumer base. Assume,
for instance, starting from a perfectly symmetric setup with n =6 ,t h a tα>0.5.
We represent this situation in ﬁgure 19 to 23. The ﬁgures are three dimensional
and we plot α,σ and s(= sA = sB) along the three axes. This time we ﬁnd that
besides the complete and the empty network, two more networks namely gAB0 and
gA00 are pairwise stable within the feasible parameter range. Figure 19 represents the
feasible parameter range. Figure 20 represents the area where the complete network
is pairwise stable. Figure 21 represents the area where the empty network is pairwise
stable. Figure 22 represents the area where the network gAB0 is pairwise stable.
Figure 23 represents the area where the network gA00 is pairwise stable.
We summarize these results of our simulations in the form of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Let n =6and parameter values satisfy constraints (4)-(6). Then, (1)
for complete symmetry, namely, α =0 .5,m=3and sA = sB, there are two pairwise
stable networks, namely the complete network and the empty network; (2) for an
asymmetry in the network capacity, namely, α =0 .5,m=3and sA >s B,t h e r ea r e
four pairwise stable networks, namely the complete network, the empty network, gAB0
and g0B0. (3) for an asymmetry in the number of ﬁrms connected to each backbone,
namely, α =0 .5,m=4and sA = sB,t h e r ea r ef o u rp a i r w i s es t a b l en e t w o r k s ,n a m e l y
the complete network, the empty network, gAB0 and g0B0 (4) for an asymmetry in the
consumer base, namely, α>0.5,m=3and sA = sB, there are four pairwise stable
networks, namely the complete network, the empty network, gAB0 and gA00.
20We summarize this in the following table.
Table 3
Nature of asymmetry Pairwise Stable Networks
None gAB1,g 000
Asymmetry in network capacity sA >s B gAB1,g 000,g AB0,g 0B0
Asymmetry in the the number of ﬁrms m>n / 2 gAB1,g 000,g AB0,g 0B0
Asymmetry in the website base α>1/2 gAB1,g 000,g AB0,g A00
We ﬁnd there are two major trends in our simulations:
(a) First, when ISPs connected to backbones whose congestion without taking to
account leakage due to peering (θl+ωl) is higher tend to intrapeer, the ISPs belonging
to the other backbone do not intrapeer.
(b) There is no interpeering in presence of asymmetries in networks other than
the complete network.
Now, (b) could be partly a due to the proposition 2 especially given the fact that
N is small. But there is likely other eﬀects that we are unable to capture in a formal
manner.
We will brieﬂy compare our results with that of DangNyugen and Penard (1999).
In their model, ISPs connected to each backbone collude with each other and behave
like a club while ours is a purely non-cooperative game. Further, in their model,
t h eo n l ya s y m m e t r yi sw i t hr e g a r dt oa ne x o g e n o u s l yg i v e nq u a l i t y ,w h i l ei no u r s
there are many sources of asymmetry and quality is determined endogenously by a
complex interaction of several factors. Their model only takes the symmetric eﬀect
into account while ours take both eﬀects into account. If we extend their results in
context of pairwise stability, one would be likely to observe the network conﬁguration
gA00,g AB0 and g0B0 depending on whether A or B is the high quality backbone. We
also ﬁnd that in our simulations, these three networks recur with some regularity.
However, depending on parameter values, two other networks namely, the complete
and empty network are also pairwise stable.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We ﬁnd that there are two main avenues by which peering aﬀects gross proﬁts. The
impact on the quality of service oﬀered by the ﬁrm given that traﬃcc a nc i r c u m v e n t
21congested backbones which we term the asymmetric eﬀect and the impact on back-
bone congestion which we term the symmetric eﬀect. The asymmetric eﬀect generally
increases gross proﬁts and the symmetric eﬀect has a negative or ambiguous impact
on gross proﬁts. The two eﬀects often work against each other making the net eﬀect
ambiguous as well.
One may object to this paper on the grounds that it does not have a punch
line. Yet, it is precisely that absence of a punchline that we strive to show. Retail
peering has quite complicated eﬀects on ﬁrm proﬁt sa n di ti sb yn om e a n sc e r t a i nt h a t
improving the quality of service by forming peering agreements would automatically
increase gross proﬁts even if we disregard the costs of peering. Peering among retail
ISPs have both a positive and negative eﬀe c tw i t hr e g a r dt og r o s sp r o ﬁts. On the
positive side, peering improves quality, increases demand and enables ﬁrms to charge
higher prices. On the negative side, it reduces diﬀerentiation and promotes stiﬀer
price competition. Also, it may lead to overuse of one’s network without adequate
reciprocity. The relative magnitude of these factors help or hinder peering. In complex
settings, such magnitudes also quite complex to analyze and give rise to a multitude of
conﬁgurations depending on the various exogenously determined factors. This paper
helps to illustrate this with the help of simulations.
22Appendix 1: We will solve for the Nash equilibrium from the second stage.




σ(niA · θA + niB · θB)
2
for all i ∈ η
e θ = α · θA +( 1− α) · θB












We know that if i ∈ A,
δi = θA · (α · di − niA · (σ/2)) + θB · ((1 − α) · di − niB · (σ/2))
If i ∈ B,
δi = θB · ((1 − α) · di − niB · (σ/2)) + θA · (α · di − niA · (σ/2))
Hence,
δi = di ·e θ − γi for all i ∈ η
Equating utilities across websites, for all i 6= j
Ui = Uj
⇒ δi + pi = δj + pj
⇒ di ·e θ − γi + pi = dj ·e θ − γj + pj = λ (say)
⇒ di =
λ + γi − pi
e θ










































































(pj − γj) − (N − 1) · (pi − γi)
!
(7)
The above equation gives us equilibrium demands for all ISPs. Next we will solve
for equilibrium prices. Proﬁts for ISP i are given by
πi = pi · di − Ci






· ni + Fl
Since Ci does not depend on prices, it can be treated as a constant.
Hence,
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N X
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T h ea b o v ee q u a t i o ng i v e su se q u i l i b r i u mp r i c e s . F r o mt h ea b o v et w oe q u a t i o n s ,










































· ni − Fl (10)
where ISP i is connected to backbone l.
25Appendix 2:.
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